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1. Introduction 
 
Market power has been a constant theme in the history of the electricity restructuring 
in England and Wales.  When the industry was restructured, the government created 
three large generating companies, two of which shared almost all the stations capable 
of setting prices in the industry’s centralised spot market.  It soon became apparent 
that these companies had the ability and the incentive to raise prices to undesirable 
levels. 
Over the course of the 1990s, the industry’s regulators attempted to mitigate 
the duopolists’ market power.  They published reports on unacceptable behaviour, 
making it impossible for the companies to repeat those tactics, while defining what 
would be allowed in future.  The generators twice divested plant to rival companies – 
once to avoid being referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, once in 
return for being allowed to merge with electricity retailers.  In the end, the regulator 
and the government together changed the market’s rules, abolishing the Pool that had 
been at the centre of the original restructuring.  At the end of the Pool’s life, prices 
finally fell below the “competitive” level of new entrants’ costs.  We may never know 
whether abolishing the Pool would have reduced prices, had the market still been 
concentrated, for it had reached a competitive structure just before it was abolished.  
This paper discusses market power and its mitigation in the electricity industry of 
England and Wales.  
 
 
2. Background 
 
When the privatisation of the electricity industry in England and Wales was planned, 
the government was determined to sell the entire industry, including the 14 nuclear 
power stations owned by the Central Electricity Generating Board.  These stations had 
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a chequered history – the eight first generation Magnox plants had mostly performed 
to expectations, but had been acknowledged to be more costly than conventional 
plants, even while still under construction in the early 1960s.  Construction started on 
four second-generation advanced gas-cooled reactors (AGRs) in the second half of 
that decade, but two of them had not been formally commissioned by 1987, and only 
one of the others had neared its design output.  Work on a fifth AGR and a pressurised 
water reactor had started during the 1980s, although many outside observers 
questioned the investment appraisals that the CEGB had used to justify their 
construction. 
 In the hope of producing a saleable package, the nuclear stations were to be 
combined with 30 GW, or 60%, of the CEGB’s conventional stations in a company 
later named National Power.  The remaining conventional stations were given to 
PowerGen.  It was hoped that PowerGen could act as a counterweight to National 
Power, despite the 70-30 split of the industry’s overall capacity.  Unfortunately, 
however, when the CEGB’s nuclear costs were finally examined in enough detail, 
they proved so unattractive that the stations had to be withdrawn from the sale.  The 
government would continue to own Nuclear Electric, with 20% of the industry’s 
capacity, while National Power would now have “only” 50%.  By the time that this 
decision was made, however, in November 1989, it was too late to consider more than 
a minor reshuffling of the industry’s assets.  The privatisation was forced to proceed 
with a highly concentrated structure in generation, although the original motive for 
this structure had been superseded. 
The industry’s new structure formally began at midnight on March 31, 1990, 
and the first privatisations took place in December.  Twelve Regional Electricity 
Companies (RECs), successors to the former Area Boards responsible for distribution 
were privatised, jointly owning the National Grid Company, which had taken over the 
CEGB’s transmission assets.  From the beginning of the privatisation, the importance 
of ensuring fair access to the transmission grid had been recognised.  NGC had been 
separated from the generators, and the RECs owned it through a holding company, to 
minimise their influence over the actual transmission company.  National Power and 
PowerGen were privatised in March 1991, and two vertically integrated Scottish 
companies in June 1991.  Because the companies were vertically integrated, 
generation prices in Scotland were regulated, using a formula that would lead them to 
converge with prices in England by the middle of the decade.  This paper accordingly 
concentrates on events south of the border.1 
The industry was given a regulator, the Director-General of Electricity Supply, 
supported by a staff at the Office of Electricity Regulation (Offer).  The first regulator 
was Professor Stephen Littlechild, appointed in 1989.  In 1998, the new Labour 
government announced its desire to combine the regulation of gas and electricity, and 
appointed Callum McCarthy as the next gas regulator.  Professor Littlechild stood 
down as electricity regulator at the end of 1998, a few months before his second term 
was due to end, to allow Mr McCarthy to combine both jobs.  In due course, Offer 
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merged with the supporting office for gas regulation to become the Office of Gas and 
Electricity Markets (Ofgem).  Those changes were made without legislation, but the 
government also wished to move from individual regulators to commissions.  Under 
the Utilities Act 2000, the responsibility for regulation passed to the Gas and 
Electricity Markets Authority (GEMA), with five executive and five non-executive 
members.  
Every company in the electricity industry is required to have a licence, with 
some small-scale exemptions.  Licences are not used as a barrier to entry, but contain 
provisions requiring the company to give information to the regulator, and allowing 
them to bury cables in streets, for example.  The licences can also contain behavioural 
conditions – the prices for monopoly activities are regulated through licence clauses, 
for example.  The larger companies were also banned from cross-subsidising any 
activities, or discriminating between any of their customers.  Licences are contracts, 
issued by the regulator or the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, and as such 
may only be changed with the consent of the company, or after the UK’s competition 
authority2 has ruled that to continue with the licence without modification would be 
against the public interest.  
The RECs were responsible for distribution and regulated as monopolists, but 
the new activity of supply had been created in order to give customers a choice over 
which company they bought their electricity from.  In 1990, 5,000 customers with a 
maximum demand of 1 MW or more had this choice (30% of units sold).  In 1994, 
another 50,000 customers, with a maximum demand of 100kW or more joined the 
competitive market (another 20% of units sold).  The remaining customers were 
originally due to become free to choose their supplier in April 1998, but the transition 
was actually phased between September 1998 and July 1999. 
Generators were allowed to become suppliers, and RECs to build power 
stations, but there were limits to the extent of this vertical re-integration.  The 
government wanted to increase competition, and feared that vertical re-integration 
would limit this, and make entry by outsiders particularly difficult.  The major 
generators were allowed to supply electricity to large customers, but their share of this 
market was initially capped, at 15% of the total sales in each region.3  This limit 
turned out to be unsustainable, for the generators were offering better deals than the 
RECs, and customers who were left outside their quota complained.  The limits were 
raised, and then abolished.  The RECs were similarly allowed to invest in power 
stations, but with strict limits on the amount of capacity that they could own.4  The 
RECs were also required to purchase power “at the best effective price reasonably 
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could have self-supplied an even higher proportion of its purchases for its smaller customers, where 
supply competition would be longest delayed and potentially least effective. 
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obtainable, having regard to the sources available”, in an attempt to prevent them 
from buying from affiliated stations at inflated prices.  Eleven of the twelve RECs 
invested in new power stations, efficient combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants, 
in the first years after privatisation.  Figure 1 shows the way in which the output from 
these Independent Power Producers (IPPs) gradually took market share from the 
major generators. 
Because it is impossible to tell which generator is actually supplying the 
electricity consumed by any given customer, and because the CEGB had been very 
concerned to preserve the physical integrity of its system, a special market known as 
the Pool was created for wholesale trading.  Generators would bid prices and 
availabilities for each of their plants, and NGC would calculate the least-cost schedule 
capable of meeting its forecast of demand.  The price bids from the most expensive 
generator in normal use would be used to calculate the System Marginal Price (SMP), 
paid for every unit in the original schedule.  Every station available to generate, or 
generating, would receive a capacity payment, based on the Value of Lost Load (set 
by the government at £2/kWh in 1990, and uprated with inflation), multiplied by the 
Loss of Load Probability.  This was intended to provide an incentive to make capacity 
available when it was most needed, and corresponds to an element in the “optimal” 
price of electricity (Green, 2000).  If NGC asked generators to deviate from the 
original schedule, to deal with forecast errors, plant breakdowns, or transmission 
constraints that reduced the amount of power that could be imported into an area, they 
would be paid on the basis of their own bid.  The cost of these adjustments was 
recovered in a charge known as Uplift, added to the price paid by suppliers. 
As part of the preparations for the privatisation, the government produced 
forecasts of the Pool price, in order to ensure that each company had sustainable 
finances.  When trading started, however, Pool prices were significantly below the 
level that the government had predicted.  This was largely because of the elaborate 
contracts that had been superimposed on the Pool. 
To reduce the risk of trading in the Pool, most sales were covered by Contracts 
for Differences (CfDs), which required one party (typically a generator) to pay back 
the difference between the Pool Purchase Price and a strike price specified in the 
contract whenever the Pool price exceeded the strike price.  When the Pool Purchase 
Price was less than the strike price, the other party (typically a supplier) would 
normally have to pay the difference to the generator.5  As long as the generator 
actually produced the volume of electricity covered by the CfD, the net effect of the 
CfD and its sales through the Pool would mean that its revenues would not be affected 
by the Pool price.  This meant that the generators had little incentive to raise the Pool 
price in the short term, and could find themselves over-contracted, with CfDs 
covering more power than they expected to generate, in which case they would 
maximise profits by keeping the Pool price low (Newbery, 1998; Green, 1999).   
Furthermore, the generators had signed three-year contracts with British Coal, 
requiring them to buy large volumes of coal at prices above those of imported coal.  
These were backed with electricity CfDs between the generators and the RECs, who 
were allowed to pass the cost on to their captive smaller consumers.  Larger 
customers, who were allowed to shop around, were expected to pay prices based on 
the Pool price, which would be determined by the cost of imported coal, since that 
was the generators’ true marginal cost of fuel.  The coal contracts, a term often used 
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to denote the generators’ contracts with both British Coal and the RECs, were needed 
to allow British Coal to cover its high costs without a direct subsidy from the 
government.  During 1990, the generators feared that they would be unable to burn all 
the coal that they were contracted to buy from British Coal, and started to reduce their 
bids in order to increase their output.  The result was an artificially low price for the 
first year of the new arrangements, shown in figure 2.  This probably suited the 
government and the industry, for it gave a period of calm for the privatisations, but it 
did produce a misleading basis for later comparisons. 
 
 
 
3. Testing the regulator: 1991-93 
 
The period of calm came to an end on September 9th, 1991, when the Pool Purchase 
Price spiked at £168/MWh.  Many industrial customers, who had agreed to buy on 
terms which effectively passed the Pool price on to them unhedged, were furious.  
The largest industrial customers had also suffered from the end of a one-year 
transitional period which had pegged any price rises to the rate of inflation.  While 
most industrial customers had seen price reductions once they were no longer 
subsidising British Coal, the largest customers had been paying prices well below 
what turned out to be the market price, and faced significant increases.    
 The regulator announced his first inquiry into Pool prices.  When the report 
(Offer, 1991) was published, in December 1991, he had established that the price 
spike was due to the way in which NGC’s computer program, GOAL, scheduled 
plant, and the interaction between the schedule and the price algorithm.  GOAL had 
scheduled a gas turbine to produce a few MWh during the early evening peak, 
choosing this as the cheapest option available to it, far cheaper than turning on a coal-
fired station.  Nevertheless, the amount bid for those few MWh set the price for the 
entire industry’s output, at a then-unprecedented level.  
 This part of the report was more of an explanation than an accusation, but the 
regulator did find things to criticise.  PowerGen had discovered that it could declare 
some of its plant to be unavailable when bids were submitted, a day ahead, and that 
this would raise the Loss of Load Probability, and hence the capacity payment, which 
was very non-linear in the amount of spare capacity.  Once the capacity payment had 
been set, PowerGen would declare its plant to be available, and hence eligible to 
receive the payment, which could not be reduced.  This abuse could be prevented by a 
rule change, however – the Pool quickly agreed that LOLP would be calculated on the 
basis of each plant’s highest availability over the previous eight days.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that generators did sometimes delay the return of a station that had 
already been out of action for more than a week, but it was no longer possible to 
manipulate LOLP by declaring a station unavailable for just a day or two. 
 To prevent further manipulation of capacity, the regulator asked the three 
major generators to accept a new condition in their regulatory licences.  Apart from 
the bans on cross-subsidy and discrimination, the generators’ licences had not initially 
contained any significant restrictions on their economic behaviour.  The new 
Condition 9A required them to inform him of their predictions for each unit’s 
availability over the coming year, their strategy for making it available, and to 
reconcile the prediction with its actual availability at the end of the year.  The licence 
condition did not impose any restrictions on what the generator’s strategy might be, 
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but it gave the regulator the information to detect potentially anti-competitive 
conduct. 
 Another part of the condition required the generators to inform the regulator if 
they planned to close any of their capacity, and allow him to appoint an independent 
assessor who would judge whether the closures were economically justified (rather 
than an attempt to reduce the plant margin and drive up LOLP), and whether the 
generators should attempt to find a buyer for the plant, rather than closing it.  In due 
course, the generators (independently) announced that they planned to close a number 
of small stations, and the regulator appointed an assessor.  The assessor’s report 
(Offer, 1993b) concluded that the closures were reasonable, since the costs of the 
plants were higher than the amount that they could expect to earn in the market from 
capacity payments and occasional operation.  The industry had a substantial margin of 
spare capacity at this time, and new plants were under construction.  The report also 
concluded that while the generators had made little effort to find buyers for the plant, 
it was unlikely that a new owner would be able to operate them at a profit, and so the 
failure to seek a buyer had no real impact.  Over the following years, the main impact 
of this part of condition 9A was to encourage the generators to mothball stations, 
rather than closing them, and to close individual units at several stations (which could 
not be put up for sale) rather than complete stations. 
 While the regulator had criticised particular tactics used by the generators, he 
did not criticise them for raising the overall level of prices.  Prices in 1990/91 had 
been below the generators’ avoidable costs, and so an increase was appropriate.  This 
is a recurrent theme in the reports published between 1991 and 1993 – the regulator 
objected to some of the generators’ tactics, but initially accepted the results of those 
tactics, in terms of the overall level of prices.  To some extent, the generators were 
testing the regulator to see what would be allowed.  
 We can see this clearly in the regulator’s next Pool-related report.  The 1991 
report had mentioned the bidding by National Power’s oil-fired station at Fawley, in 
the south of England.  The relatively high cost of oil meant that this station was rarely 
required to run in the main schedule, but was sometimes used to relieve transmission 
constraints, for which it was paid a price based on its own bid, regardless of SMP.  
Since it was the only station capable of doing so, it could bid high prices, and did so.  
The regulator promised to investigate this.  When the Report on constrained-on plant 
(Offer, 1992a) appeared, it covered a number of other stations subject to transmission 
constraints.  The regulator agreed that National Power had based its bids on estimates 
of each station’s costs, and had sometimes reduced its bids in order to avoid over-
recovery against its targets.  He viewed this as a responsible strategy.  PowerGen, 
however, had submitted extremely high bids from two small stations scheduled for 
closure.  Because of the closures, NGC had to reinforce its transmission system in 
each area, creating temporary transmission constraints that the stations exploited.  
PowerGen was criticised for its behaviour, which was not repeated.  The regulator 
suggested that a contract between NGC and a station likely to be constrained would 
be a better way of ensuring that the station could cover its costs than relying on high 
bids in the Pool, and NGC duly introduced such contracts.  Overall, the tone of the 
report was that the regulator was happy for the generators to find a way to cover their 
costs, and make some profit, but that excessive profits were undesirable. 
 A second “specialised” report, on gas turbine plant (Offer 1992b), continued 
this theme.   The generators had argued that they were unable to cover the costs of 
their open cycle gas turbine plants.  These had high marginal costs, were used for 
peak power and to provide reserve, and should not be confused with combined cycle 
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gas turbines, which had a much higher thermal efficiency, lower costs, and were used 
for base load generation.  The regulator agreed that the stations’ costs were higher 
than the income that they were likely to earn from capacity payments, and the 
generators took this as permission to raise those stations’ bids. 
 In the summer of 1992, however, the overall level of prices rose. The 
generators were now negotiating to replace their original three-year contracts, and were 
anxious that Pool prices should not stay “below ... realistic reference levels for the 
negotiation of future contracts” (National Power, quoted in Offer, 1992c, p 52).  Offer 
reported on the increase after customers complained, but found that Pool prices in 
1991/2 had been below the generators’ avoidable costs, so that it was “difficult to object 
to an increase” (ibid p 2).  At the same time, the regulator “conclude[d] that National 
Power and PowerGen together had market power and exercised it in a significant way” 
(ibid).  
 The original contracts finally expired in April 1993, and their replacements 
covered a lower proportion of the generators’ sales and of their fuel requirements.  This 
effectively raised their marginal costs, and their gain from higher prices, and SMP 
jumped again.  The regulator’s response (1993a) came much more quickly, in July.  (The 
previous reports on price increases had been published in December).  The regulator 
blamed the increases on National Power and PowerGen: “both companies wanted a price 
increase and they were able to achieve it” (Offer, 1993a, p ii).  “The need to cover 
avoidable costs [did] not justify any further price increases - nor did it justify a price 
increase as high as the recent one” (p iii).  He acknowledged that the generators also 
needed to cover their unavoidable costs and make a profit, but that they also received 
revenues from contracts.  He announced that he would review these issues, and decide 
by the end of the year whether the generators should be referred to the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission – bringing forward an earlier commitment to make such a decision 
by 1995.  It seemed that the generators had finally pushed the regulator too far. 
 
 
 
4. The generators’ undertakings: 1994-96 
 
After the third Pool Price Inquiry, the regulator moved towards putting direct 
constraints on the generators.  He had three ways of doing this – by agreeing an 
amendment to their licences (as with Condition 9A), by imposing an amendment, 
which required a reference to the MMC under the Electricity Act 1989, or by asking 
the MMC to impose some other remedy under the Fair Trading Act 1973.  This was 
potentially the most wide-ranging, as the MMC could have recommended that the 
generators be broken up.  Referring the generators to the MMC was not without risk 
for the regulator, as either the Commission or the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, who had the final decision on whether to implement a Fair Trading Act 
reference, might have decided to take no action.  Like an early firearm, prone to 
misfire and slow to reload, the MMC was potentially more useful as a threat than in 
active use.  
 The regulator was able to use the threat of an MMC reference, which the 
generators were plainly keen to avoid, to win concessions from them, announced in 
February 1994 (Offer, 1994a).  In the period since privatisation, the RECs had built 
several new power stations, and more were under construction.  Almost all of these 
were combined-cycle gas turbines, with lower operating costs than the generators’ 
coal-fired stations, which they started to displace in the merit order.  The market for 
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base load, continuous, operation, which already contained Nuclear Electric and 
imports from France and Scotland, was becoming reasonably competitive.  The 
pumped storage hydro stations owned by NGC were effective competitors at peak 
times, but the intervening segment of the market, for mid-merit stations, was still 
dominated by National Power and PowerGen.  Reducing this dominance was the 
regulator’s main aim. 
 National Power gave an undertaking to use all reasonable endeavours to sell or 
otherwise dispose of 4 GW of “mid-merit” plant, and PowerGen to dispose of 2 GW, 
within two years.  These disposals would mean that each generator would face a more 
elastic residual demand curve in that part of the market, reducing their incentive and 
ability to raise prices.  In return, the regulator effectively promised not to refer the 
companies to the MMC during the two-year period. 
 To protect customers in the period before the disposals could take effect, the 
generators undertook “to bid … in such a way that, under reasonable assumptions for 
other generators’ bids … the annual average Pool Purchase Price would in normal 
circumstances” be less than 2.4 p/kWh on a time-weighted basis.  On a demand-
weighted basis, the price had to be less than 2.55 p/kWh, in October 1993 prices.  
They agreed to sell contracts at prices compatible with these, although a normal risk 
premium could be included.   
For the first months of 1994/5, Pool prices were well below these levels 
(raised to 2.46 p/kWh time-weighted and 2.61 p/kWh demand-weighted in 1994/95 
prices).  During December 1994, however, prices rose significantly, although they 
were still compatible with the undertaking.   By January 1995, two nuclear stations 
were unexpectedly out of action, reducing the margin of spare capacity and increasing 
LOLP, and the higher capacity payments pushed prices to record levels.  On January 
15th, a unit at National Power’s Eggborough station failed.  Under the Pool rules, this 
would feed through to LOLP in eight days’ time, and duly did so.  
 The regulator published a statement (Offer, 1995a) pointing out that the 
generators had undertaken to keep prices down, and that if they had failed to do so at 
the end of the year, he would decide whether the failure constituted a breach of their 
undertaking, or was due to abnormal circumstances.  PowerGen had already sharply 
reduced its bids, and National Power did so a couple of days later.  The government 
was about to sell the second tranche of their shares, and would have had every reason 
to put pressure on the companies to avoid any threat of a reference to the MMC.  Even 
so, National Power’s prospectus implies that the company was not sure that it would 
be able to avoid a reference for failing to meet the price undertaking. 
 In the event, the time-weighted price was approximately two per cent below 
the level specified in the undertaking, because prices during February and March had 
been extremely low.  The demand-weighted price was one per cent above the level in 
the undertaking, however.  When the regulator published a report (Offer, 1995b) on 
the matter, he concluded that this was not a breach of the undertaking.  The proximate 
cause of the high prices was an unusual level of plant failures.  His staff had used data 
supplied under Condition 9A to calculate the probability of a combination of plant 
availability (which was lower than usual) and demand (also low, and therefore 
helping to reduce prices) that could have breached the undertaking, given the 
generators’ behaviour up to the end of December.  They concluded that the 
combination was relatively unusual, and that the generators’ failure to keep prices 
down did not conflict with their undertaking to bid to produce that price level “in 
normal circumstances”. 
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 In the second year, 1995/6, out-turn prices were again very close to the level 
specified in the undertakings, but this time both were within the cap.  There was a 
brief discussion of the possibility of continuing with a price undertaking, but the 
regulator made it clear that he preferred not to do so.  The only attempt to regulate the 
level of prices was not a particularly happy experience.  The undertakings certainly 
helped those large customers who were buying at Pool-related prices in the winter of 
1994-95.  They may have kept annual contract prices down, although we cannot know 
whether prices would in fact have continued to rise in the absence of the undertakings.  
They had no real impact on the prices paid by small consumers, which depended on 
five-year contracts unaffected by the undertakings.  On the downside, some traders 
alleged that they had been disadvantaged in early 1994, when National Power and 
PowerGen knew of the undertakings that were about to be announced, and traded 
accordingly.  The prices in the undertakings were chosen on an ad hoc basis.  This 
was acceptable for a one-off negotiation, but a more formal process would have been 
required for a continuing price cap, and it would have been hard to calculate an 
appropriate level.  The undertakings had the potential to affect the revenues of every 
company in the industry.  Nuclear Electric in particular had been seriously 
disadvantaged, since it had generally sold more of its output in the Pool or on short-
term contracts than other generators.  In 1994, the company had been owned by the 
government, which could absorb the cost of its regulator’s actions, but by 1996, the 
more modern stations had been privatised.  Mitigating market power by capping the 
overall price of electricity would effectively have meant abandoning the market-based 
ethos of the privatisation.  
 In the long term, market power mitigation therefore depended upon the other 
undertaking, that designed to change the market structure.  The formal undertaking 
did not require the generators to seek the regulator’s approval for the manner of the 
disposal, but since the regulator had only committed himself not to seek an MMC 
reference during the two-year period in which the generators were to arrange the 
sales, it was obviously in their interest to ensure that he was happy with the manner in 
which they were carried out.  The prospectus for the privatisation of the second 
tranche of PowerGen’s shares (Kleinwort Benson Limited, 1995) hints at the 
negotiations that took place, and the company’s fear that it would be unable to 
negotiate a mutually acceptable plan.   
In the event, both companies were able to find deals that satisfied the 
regulator, and leased their plant to Eastern Group, one of the RECs.  The key issue 
was that both generators wanted to impose an “earn-out”, of £6/MWh, on each unit 
generated by the leased stations, alongside any annual lease payments.  The problem, 
from the generators’ point of view, was that most of the remaining coal-fired stations 
had very similar costs.  The stations with higher costs included those recently fitted 
with Flue Gas Desulphurisation equipment to reduce emissions of sulphur dioxide, 
which reduced their thermal efficiency by about ten percent.  The generators wanted 
to operate those stations at high load factors (and had come under political pressure 
when it appeared that their load factors were falling), which meant that their other 
stations were bidding above cost to stay further down the merit order.  The divested 
stations could have undercut these stations, increased their output, and moved out of 
the mid-merit part of the market.  The generators were worried that the regulator 
would then decide that mid-merit competition had not yet increased sufficiently, and 
call for further divestitures.  In the end, the regulator allowed the disposals to go 
ahead on this basis.  In one sense, the earn-out made the divested stations less 
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effective as competitors, but it did keep them in the right part of the market, 
increasing the elasticity of each major generator’s residual demand curve. 
One factor that helped persuade the generators to bite the bullet and actually 
dispose of their plant was their desire to merge with RECs.  In September 1995, 
PowerGen announced a merger with Midlands Electricity, closely followed by 
National Power, which planned to merge with Southern Electric.  Both mergers were 
referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, which reported the following 
March (MMC, 1996a, b).  Unusually, the commission’s report was leaked before the 
relevant Minister6 had made his decision on the case.  The Economist based its lead 
story on the leak, and was very critical of the Commission’s majority view that the 
mergers could be acceptable, given certain conditions.  A note of dissent by one of the 
five Commission members responsible for the report held that the structure of the 
industry was still in flux, and that allowing the mergers at this point, which would 
make entry into generation more difficult, could foreclose some of the more 
competitive options.  Many other commentators took the same line, and the Minister 
in due course announced that he was blocking the merger.   
 Merger policy might seem remote from market power mitigation, but it can be 
important in minimising the amount of market power that has to be mitigated.  If 
National Power and PowerGen had merged with RECs in 1996, potential entrants into 
generation would have found fewer would-be buyers for their output.  At the time, 
almost all entrants had signed long-term sales contracts with RECs before starting to 
build their stations, and no-one knew whether “merchant plant” would be financially 
viable.  Their greater risks would have been reflected in a significantly greater cost of 
capital than stations with long-term contracts, and hence a higher entry price.  Since 
the fear of entry was a potential constraint on wholesale prices, mergers that would 
have made entry less likely, and raised the price at which entrants could compete, 
could have allowed the major generators to raise their prices. 
 
 
5. Changing the rules: 1997-2001 
In May 1997, a Labour government took office.  The Labour Party still had strong 
emotional ties to Britain’s coal miners, although their numbers had fallen from 
300,000 in 1979 to barely 16,000 in 1997.  Much of this decline had been due to 
greater productivity in the coal industry, as output had been concentrated on fewer, 
more mechanised, pits, but part was due to a reduction in the amount of coal burned in 
power stations.  There had been a “dash for gas” in the early 1990s, as both the RECs 
and the major generators ordered CCGT stations.   The RECs had wanted some 
unregulated income and a hedge against the major generators’ market power (or 
perhaps the ability to share in it, if wholesale prices stayed high).  The major 
generators saw gas-fired stations as the best way to meet targets for reducing sulphur 
emissions and maintain market share in the face of the inevitable threat from new 
entrants.  A second “dash for gas” in the mid-1990s had continued the trend.  By 
2000, 39% of the UK’s electricity came from gas-fired stations, compared with less 
than 1% in 1990. 
The original set of linked coal and electricity contracts imposed at 
privatisation had ended in 1993, and the government had helped to broker a set of 
five-year contracts to replace them, albeit with much lower volumes of coal.  In the 
autumn of 1997, it became clear that the electricity companies would be reluctant to 
                                                          
6 The Victorian title of President of the Board of Trade was being used by the Secretary of State in the 
Department of Trade and Industry at this time. 
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agree another set of long-term contracts, and that their coal requirements were set to 
fall further. 
 The government announced a moratorium on new gas-fired power stations, 
ostensibly to help the coal industry.  This took the form of refusing to issue the formal 
consent7 needed before work could start on new stations, and accordingly had no 
impact on the stations already under construction, or the demand for coal over the 
next two years.  To look at the long term issues, the government started a review of 
energy sources for power stations, and in October 1997, asked the regulator “to 
consider how a review of electricity trading arrangements might be undertaken” 
(Ofgem, 1999c, p13).  The regulator produced his interim conclusions in June 1998, 
recommending that the Pool should be replaced (Offer, 1998b).  
 
5a The market rules 
The regulator had become disillusioned with the Pool.  It had been designed to make 
rule changes difficult, in order to protect minority interests, but in practice this had 
allowed small numbers of companies to block changes widely thought to be desirable.  
Demand-side bidding was a case in point.  An experimental scheme had been 
introduced to allow a few industrial and commercial customers to bid demand 
reductions into the Pool as a kind of “negative generation”, but while the scheme was 
cumbersome, and pleased no-one, it had been impossible to agree on a successor.  
NGC was required to schedule plant against a demand forecast, and was explicitly 
forbidden to predict any responses to market prices when producing this forecast.   
The Pool Rules, and in particular the way in which prices were determined, 
were extremely complex.  This deterred secondary trading in electricity, although 
since the coal-related contracts had covered a high proportion of most companies’ 
requirements until April 1998, the primary trading volumes that would have to lie at 
the heart of a secondary market were also very low.  The complexity had also made it 
possible for the generators to learn how to “game” the rules and raise their revenues – 
each time the regulator had frowned on a particular practice, the generators had 
adopted another.  The generators gained from the fact that their bids were not “firm” – 
if a station became unavailable, it had to buy back its scheduled output at its own bid 
price, which generally implied that it would retain a profit margin, rather than having 
to pay for the costs of replacement generation.  Similarly, all demand paid the same 
price, whether it was completely predictable, requiring little in the way of reserve 
generation, or very unpredictable, imposing significant reserve costs. 
The fact that the Pool was a compulsory market went against the instincts of 
some, even though it was generally possible to use a zero price bid to ensure that your 
plant was scheduled, and contracts for differences to lock in revenues, regardless of 
the Pool price.  “On-site” generation was not required to pay for the system costs 
recovered through Uplift, and an earlier consultation on “Trading outside the Pool” 
(Offer, 1994b) had attracted some respondents who seemed to think that by-passing 
the Pool would also allow them to avoid these costs. 
The most important charge against the Pool, however, was that its uniform 
price rule enhanced market power.  The simplest version of this argument is based 
upon a fallacy – some stations bid zero, but get the market price, so if they were only 
paid their own bid, the average price would fall.  The fallacy ignores the fact that the 
stations would promptly change their bidding strategy if the market rules were 
changed.  In a competitive market with no risk aversion, the change in strategy would 
                                                          
7 Under the Section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989, the government had to give consent for all new 
power stations, but the consent had not been used as a barrier to entry before this time.  
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exactly offset the change in market rules – an implication of the revenue equivalence 
theorem in auction design.  There were suggestions that some generators would be so 
anxious to ensure that they were scheduled that they would be willing to sell for less 
than the going market price, which would indeed reduce the cost of power.  A 
counter-argument might suggest that some suppliers would be anxious to secure 
supplies and pay more than the going rate. 
 The key argument related to the way in which the uniform price rule reduced 
the risks of attempting to raise the market price.  A generator could bid in most of its 
plant at low prices, ensuring that they would be scheduled to generate, and submit a 
few bids at significantly higher levels, hoping that these would set the price received 
by all stations.  In practice, the fact that the bids had to last for twenty-four hours 
limited the impact of this.  Stations that attempted to raise the over-night price might 
risk not being called when demand picked up in the early morning, although it could 
have been an attractive strategy at peak times.   
Against this, low-cost plants would face a difficult problem in deciding how 
high to set their prices, aware that they lose money from bidding too low, but might 
not be scheduled if they asked for too much.  Bower and Bunn (2000) use a 
simulation model to suggest that bilateral trading would in fact produce higher prices 
than the Pool, due to the generators’ reactions to issues of this kind. 
 The Pool was also criticised for discriminating against coal, and in favour of 
nuclear and gas-fired plant.  The complaint was actually more about market power 
than the Pool itself.  Nuclear and gas-fired generators had increased their output, 
bidding low to ensure that they were scheduled but still receiving the Pool price.  As 
discussed above, changing the rules would have changed their strategy, but not 
necessarily their revenues.  The problem for the coal industry was that the major 
generators had preferred to keep prices up, reducing their output and their demand for 
coal, rather than to enter into a price war.  The generators’ preference for high prices 
did not depend upon the Pool’s existence. 
 The regulator concluded that the Pool should be abolished and replaced with 
“trading arrangements more in line with those being adopted in other competitive 
commodity and energy markets” (Offer, 1998, p 3).  Eventually, these New Electricity 
Trading Arrangements (NETA) consisted of bilateral forwards and futures markets, 
and (originally) three power exchanges for trading until shortly before delivery, 
organised independently of the NETA programme, a balancing mechanism run by 
NGC, and a process for imbalance settlement.  In the balancing mechanism, NGC 
accepts offers to raise output or reduce demand, if it is short of power, and bids to 
reduce output or raise demand if it has a surplus.  All of the accepted trades are 
bilateral transactions with NGC, paid their own bid or offer.  Any market participant 
that is short of power when its physical position and its contract holdings are 
compared has to pay the System Buy Price, originally the average cost of the accepted 
offers in the balancing mechanism.  Any market participant that has a surplus of 
power when its physical position and its contract holdings are compared was paid the 
System Sell Price, originally based on the average cost of the accepted bids in the 
balancing mechanism.  In NETA’s first year, the mean System Buy Price was 
£38.66/MWh, while the mean System Sell Price was £9.20/MWh.  The difference was 
intended to penalise those participants who were out of balance, and give them an 
incentive to balance their positions before bilateral trading between participants 
stopped, at “Gate Closure”. 
 In October, the government accepted the regulator’s proposals (DTI, 1998), 
and the detailed design work started.  The original plan was to switch to NETA in the 
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autumn of 2000, but the timetable slipped, due to the complexity of the systems 
involved.  NETA eventually started on March 27, 2001, at a cost of £580 million.8 
 
 
5b The generators’ rules  
The electricity market did not stand still while NETA was being discussed and 
implemented.  National Power and PowerGen had divested 6 GW of plant in 1996, 
but this proved inadequate to restrain their market power.  In real terms, the annual 
average (time-weighted) Pool price had fallen each year from 1993/94 to 1996/97, but 
the following year, it rose slightly.  More significantly, there was a dramatic increase 
in SMP, offsetting a sharp reduction in capacity payments.  This implied that the 
generators had been setting SMP at a level that they believed produced an 
“acceptable” overall price, even after the end of the undertaking on prices.  The 
regulator returned to his previous practice, of publishing a report examining events 
and recommending remedies.  He stated that there was “no justification” for the 
higher prices, and concluded that “the most effective route for increasing competition 
in the short term would seem to be to transfer more of National Power’s and 
PowerGen’s coal-fired plant into the hands of competitors” (Offer, 1998a, p 36).  
 In July 1998, PowerGen bought East Midlands, one of the RECs.  The 
Director General of Fair Trading, the government’s general advisor on competition 
policy, considered that this deal should be referred to the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission, like the 1995 merger attempts.  The regulator, however, believed that 
the deal could be used as a lever for plant divestments.  He recommended that the 
merger should be allowed, provided that PowerGen divest 6 GW of plant, out of the 
14 GW it then owned.  The RECs’ franchised monopoly over supply to small 
customers was about to end, and the regulator must have believed that greater 
competition in generation would offset any problems that vertical integration might 
create.  The government followed the regulator in allowing the deal, but only required 
the divestiture of 4 GW of plant.  These divestitures must not contain any earn-out 
provisions, and PowerGen was also required to end the earn-out clauses in its existing 
lease with Eastern. 
 In November, National Power announced that it was buying the supply 
business of Midlands Electricity, and that it wished to sell Drax, a 4 GW coal-fired 
station.  National Power was slightly larger than PowerGen (with 16 GW of plant at 
this time), and the new electricity regulator joined the Director General of Fair 
Trading in arguing for an MMC reference.  The Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, however, treated National Power in the same way that his predecessor9 had 
treated PowerGen – 4 GW of plant disposals and the end of the earn-out with Eastern 
would be sufficient to allow the merger.  
 While the generators were negotiating these sales, in February 1999, Offer 
published its eighth report on Pool prices (Offer, 1999a).  The main issue was the 
number of “spikes” that were being produced – high levels of SMP that only lasted 
for a short period.  The generators were bidding an increasing number of units with a 
low “incremental” price for most of their capacity, but a high incremental price for the 
                                                          
8 NAO (2003, p.2) cites costs of £39 million for Ofgem and the Department of Trade and Industry, and 
an Ofgem estimate of up to £580 million in costs for the industry.  It also states that closing the Pool 
cost £40 million less than expected, which I am offsetting against the other estimates. 
9 The regulator’s advice on a reference was given after Callum McCarthy had taken over from Stephen 
Littlechild as Director General of Electricity Supply in January 1999, while Peter Mandelson resigned 
as Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in December 1998, and Stephen Byers succeeded him.  
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last few MW.  The scheduling programme, SUPERGOAL, would normally avoid 
scheduling the high-priced MW, but would occasionally find that they were the 
cheapest way of meeting a small increase in demand – the cost of those MW would be 
less than the cost of starting up another station.  Unfortunately, the Pool rules set SMP 
very close to the price of those few MW, and applied it to all the electricity traded in 
that half-hour.10  The average level of prices was no higher in 1998/9 than the 
previous year, but the regulator was concerned that the increasing volatility would 
lead to an increase in contract premia. 
 The Pool had already agreed to make some changes to the scheduling software 
that would reduce the incidence of these price spikes.  The report suggested that 
further changes might be desirable, in particular requiring generators to bid a single 
incremental price per MWh scheduled for each unit (in addition to a price for starting 
up and for running in each half-hour).  This would make it impossible to bid a few 
units at a high price.  The report also suggested that “inflexibility markers”, which 
allowed generators to declare that their plant would have to run in a particular way, 
guaranteeing its output, but removing it from the price-setting process, might also be 
abolished.  Inflexibility markers had been intended to reflect operational constraints, 
but their “commercial” use was commonplace.  Reducing the number of stations able 
to set SMP made the price more volatile. 
 Following consultation, the regulator decided not to make any of these 
changes to the rules (Offer, 1999b), but promised to monitor the Pool closely, and 
adopt them if problems recurred.  Problems did recur, in the regulator’s opinion, in 
July.  In the first two weeks of the month, the Pool Purchase Price was £32.52/MWh, 
some 80% higher than in the same period of the previous year, partly due to higher 
capacity payments, and partly due to an increase in SMP.  National Power and 
PowerGen had taken the opportunity to raise their bids, compensating for an earlier 
period of lower prices.  The regulator’s view was that in a competitive market, it 
would not be possible to behave in this way (Ofgem, 1999a).   
 The regulator largely rejected changes to the Pool Rules as a means of 
preventing similar problems in future – the actions taken against price spikes had 
worked, and National Power and PowerGen could have raised prices, even if the 
pricing rules had been much simpler.  He did raise concerns about the way in which 
capacity payments were calculated – the high payments had not been due to a 
particular shortage of plant, but to the way in which newer stations were often treated 
as relatively unreliable when calculating the loss of load probability (Ofgem, 1999b).   
 His preferred approach was to insert a new condition into the licences of the 
larger generators.  The market abuse licence condition, as it would become known, 
would prohibit the abuse of a position of substantial market power.  In particular, the 
generator might be abusing its position if it “(a) acts in such a way as materially to 
prejudice the efficient and economical balancing of the transmission system; (b) 
without good cause limits generation or capacity availability in such ways as 
materially to increase wholesale prices for electricity; or (c) pursues discriminatory 
pricing policies by determining wholesale prices for electricity that differ unduly 
between times when market demand and cost conditions are otherwise similar” 
(Competition Commission, 2000, p 382).  If the regulator believed that a generator 
                                                          
10 Ironically, if the station had generated the additional MW throughout the day, the price-setting 
formula would have produced a much lower price.  The formula gave the average cost of power from 
the unit if it stayed in the same output range throughout the day, and the addition of a few high-priced 
MW in each half-hour would have little impact on this average cost.  The formula failed to adjust 
correctly for a unit that switched between incremental prices during the day. 
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was in breach of the condition, he would investigate, and could issue an Order 
requiring the company not to repeat the behaviour.  Failure to comply with the Order 
could be penalised. 
 Following further consultations, the regulator asked the seven largest 
generators to accept the condition in their licences on January 31, 2000.  National 
Power, PowerGen, TXU (formerly Eastern), Edison (which had bought plant from 
PowerGen the previous year) and BNFL Magnox (the state-owned company running 
the oldest nuclear stations) all accepted the condition.  London Electricity also did so 
a few months later, when it bought Sutton Bridge power station and became large 
enough to qualify.  British Energy (the nuclear generator privatised in 1996) and AES 
(which had bought Drax from National Power) refused to accept the condition, 
however, and the issue was referred to the Competition Commission. 
 The regulator showed how the condition would work in practice in July 2000, 
when he published an investigation into the withdrawal of capacity by Edison.  The 
company had closed a 500 MW unit at one of its coal-fired stations at the end of 
March, expecting prices too low to sustain its profitable operation.  Prices 
subsequently rose significantly, and on 15 June, Ofgem announced that it would 
launch a formal investigation, after (confidential) correspondence and discussions 
with Edison had failed to resolve the situation.  On 12 July, Ofgem announced that it 
had found Edison’s withdrawal to be in breach of the condition, but that, since Edison 
had agreed to return the unit to service, Ofgem would take no further action (Ofgem, 
2000).  Ofgem’s position was that Edison had substantial market power, for taking the 
unit out of service had increased Pool prices by 11.5% over the first 47 days of 
2000/1, due to higher capacity payments.  Ofgem argued that Edison’s avoidable costs 
were lower than the station’s revenues would have been, and so withdrawing the unit 
was not a normal competitive response.  In later submissions to the Competition 
Commission, Edison disputed Ofgem’s views, arguing that the key factor had been 
the failure to obtain a contract for the unit’s output before it was withdrawn.  Once a 
suitable contract was obtained, the company took the decision to return the unit to 
service (Competition Commission, 2000, 2.214).   
The Commission commented that it was unfortunate that the investigation had 
not resolved the issues of when Edison might have been able to obtain a suitable 
contract, and whether Edison could reasonably have foreseen the impact of its 
withdrawal on prices.  If Edison had not been able to foresee that prices would rise so 
much (i.e., if the conditions in which they did rise were unusual), then the regulator’s 
actions effectively relied on hindsight.  
One other unusual feature of the case is that there was no public investigation 
into TXU, which had actually withdrawn 2 GW of plant, four times as much, at the 
same time as Edison, but announced that it would return 500 MW to service on June 
13.  The Competition Commission’s report, however, contains five paragraphs 
referring to another investigation, but with all the text removed from the published 
version, which normally implies that the matters discussed there are commercially 
confidential.  Because the Commission tries not to change the formatting of the 
report, it is possible to infer that the subject of this other investigation had a very short 
name.  Could TXU have held the same kind of confidential correspondence as Edison 
during May and early June, and avoided adverse publicity by agreeing to return a 
single unit (out of four withdrawn), two days before Ofgem reported that Edison was 
under investigation?  
 Did the market abuse licence condition fulfil its intended purpose, protecting 
consumers by forcing a reluctant generator to return plant to service?  Alternatively, 
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were Edison’s worries about the regulator’s calculations, and the Commission’s about 
the possible reliance upon hindsight, justified?  Was it desirable that Ofgem’s 
discussions with a second company were kept secret?  This is particularly relevant 
when Ofgem had promised that companies would be able to obtain confidential 
guidance if they were unsure whether particular bidding tactics would be in breach of 
the condition.  Any general principles that emerged would be published, but there was 
still “a risk that market participants which have received such guidance will have an 
information advantage over those which have not” (ibid, 2.255). 
 In the event, the Commission decided that leaving British Energy’s and AES’ 
licences unmodified could not be expected to operate against the public interest, 
reporting in December 2000.  The regulator accordingly withdrew the market abuse 
licence condition from the licences of the companies that had already accepted it, as 
he had promised to do in the interests of non-discrimination.  He had argued that the 
Commission should take this action, and its effects, into account as a consequence of 
failing to include the condition in the licences of the companies they were reporting 
on.  The Commission, however, took a narrower view, and concentrated on the 
potential behaviour of the two companies alone. 
 The Commission distinguished between the abuse of market power and the 
manipulation of market rules, considering that the latter should be dealt with mainly 
by changing those rules.  All wholesale electricity markets rely on some rule-based 
arrangements for short-term balancing, but the Pool had been more vulnerable than 
NETA would be, because prices for all generators were based upon rules.  The 
Commission paid more attention to the danger of market manipulation under the Pool 
than under NETA, in part because it was hard to predict what would happen.  AES 
held a long-term contract to sell its output to TXU, which meant that it had no 
incentive to raise Pool prices by reducing its output.11  British Energy also held 
enough contracts for the expected life of the Pool, which was then due to end on 27 
March 2001, to have no incentive to withhold capacity before that time.  The 
Commission saw a small danger that if the life of the Pool was prolonged (which did 
not in fact happen) and British Energy chose to remain under-contracted during that 
period, it would have an incentive to raise Pool prices.  The Commission did not 
believe that keeping itself under-contracted in the run-up to the introduction of NETA 
would be a sensible strategy for the company.   
The Commission acknowledged that it was difficult to predict the 
opportunities that might exist to manipulate market rules or to abuse market power 
once NETA had started.  However, NETA had been designed to be less vulnerable to 
manipulation, and the Commission expected all of its components apart from the 
balancing mechanism to be reasonably competitive, given the number of traders (ibid, 
2.231).  The Commission also noted that the governance arrangements were designed 
to allow rapid rule changes in response to problems.  The Commission was concerned 
that the broadly-based market abuse licence condition would cause uncertainty, 
“because of the difficulty of distinguishing between abusive and acceptable conduct, 
and would risk deterring normal competitive behaviour” (1.12).  The Commission 
believed that “competition should be given the opportunity to work in the new 
circumstances of NETA, and with a less concentrated generation sector, without the 
introduction at this stage of new broadly-framed regulation” (ibid). 
 The government and the regulator considered reintroducing a modified, 
narrower, version of the condition, using the Secretary of State’s “NETA power” 
                                                          
11 Reducing output would presumably have made the company into a net buyer in the Pool, just as 
prices had risen! 
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(DTI, 2001a).  For a limited period, the Secretary of State could impose licence 
amendments on electricity companies, without either their consent or a reference to 
the Competition Commission, if this was necessary as part of NETA.   A number of 
generators argued that to use this power to impose a condition so close to the one that 
had been rejected by the Commission was inappropriate, and in December 2001, the 
government quietly announced that it did not believe that it was “at present … 
necessary or expedient to use the Secretary of State’s NETA power in this area” (DTI, 
2001b). 
 
 
6. Market power after NETA 
 
Although the condition’s reception had been hostile, the main reason for the change of 
heart is likely to be the performance of NETA.  The average level of prices was 
initially much lower than under the Pool, to the extent that a number of generators 
faced financial difficulties, most notably British Energy and AES.  TXU Europe also 
left the market, although given its physical position as a net buyer in the wholesale 
market, it should have gained from lower prices – the problem was that it had agreed 
too many long-term contracts to buy power at what turned out to be excessive prices.  
Prices in the balancing mechanism have been volatile, but a number of rule changes to 
reduce this volatility have been agreed, and NGC has learned to operate the system 
without calling on high-priced generators as often as it used to.  It appeared that the 
problem of market power in England and Wales may have been solved. 
 One of NETA’s design objectives was to give the regulator more ability to 
change the market rules.  Rule changes must be proposed by the industry, and are 
assessed by the Balancing and Settlement Code Panel, which is required to make 
recommendations to Ofgem as to whether a proposed change will help meet specified 
objectives.  Ofgem, or rather its governing Authority, then decides whether to approve 
the change.  This has allowed a large number of modifications to be made since 
NETA came into effect, some of them processed very quickly.12   
 One significant modification changed the timescale for the balancing 
mechanism.  At first, bilateral trading had to stop three and a half hours before real 
time, to give NGC as much time as possible to balance the system, after the deadline 
for gas suppliers with interruptible contracts to notify power stations that their fuel 
was going to be cut off.  As NGC gained experience, it was willing to allow bilateral 
trading for longer, and the gate closure at which bilateral trading had to cease was 
moved up to one hour before real time.  This reduces the length of time for which 
generators will be exposed to imbalance charges if they have an unexpected outage, 
reducing risks and hence costs.  NGC, meanwhile, is allowed to start to trade before 
gate closure, so that plant that requires more time to get ready can be prepared.   
 Another modification concerned the imbalance prices.  There had been 
concern that most market participants were trying to have a positive imbalance, rather 
than to be perfectly balanced, and succeeding in this, on average.  This made NGC’s 
life harder, as it had to cope with the consequences of generators wanting to produce 
more power than they had sold to suppliers who were trying to buy more power than 
their customers would take.  Since generation has to equal customer demand, NGC 
had to get rid of the surplus in the balancing mechanism, or try to reduce it by trading 
                                                          
12 Since August 2005, market participants have been able to appeal to the Competition Commission if 
the Authority and the BSC Panel disagree on whether to implement a modification, providing a balance 
to the regulator’s powers that had previously been missing. 
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beforehand.13  Furthermore, it seems harsh to penalise a market participant for an 
imbalance in the opposite direction to the market as a whole – the individual 
imbalance is then lowering the market imbalance, and reducing costs.  A modification 
to the rules for setting imbalance prices took effect in February 2003, so that 
imbalances in the “neutral” direction will be cashed out at a price based on trades in 
the short-term markets, rather than at NGC’s accepted offers or bids.  The gap 
between the System Buy Price and the System Sell Price fell significantly once this 
rule change took effect. 
 Ofgem’s own view is that “available evidence suggests that the electricity 
generation sector in the UK is competitive” (2003a, p 2).  This has become clear from 
the way in which it has treated a number of regulatory decisions since NETA came 
into effect.  In September 2002, PowerGen applied to have the licence condition that 
required it to give the regulator information about its stations’ availability and its 
closure plans removed from its licence.14  Following a consultation, Ofgem agreed 
that the condition would be disapplied – it is still in the licence, so can be turned on 
again if required, but for the time being, the company does not have to provide the 
information specified in the condition.  Ofgem’s reasons for disapplying the condition 
were that it had adequate powers to obtain most of the information in other ways, and 
that the market had become much more competitive than when it was first introduced.  
Innogy (the former National Power) and British Energy soon followed suit and had 
the condition disapplied in their own licences. 
 The industry has become increasingly vertically integrated over time.  When 
Eastern acquired plant from National Power and PowerGen, taking it well over its 
own-generation limit, the REC was required not to buy any more electricity from 
affiliated power stations in order to resell it to small consumers in its own area.  Since 
the restriction would apply to new contracts with the REC’s existing power stations, 
the intention was that such self-dealing would eventually wither away.  Other mergers 
between generation and incumbent supply businesses were subject to similar 
restrictions.  In 2002, however, Ofgem started a consultation on lifting these 
restrictions.  One reason was that it had become unenforceable – the companies just 
did not have identifiable portfolios of contracts that could be assigned to particular 
customer groups.  The second reason, again, was the increase in competition.  Ofgem 
decided that the retail market was sufficiently competitive, and the wholesale market 
sufficiently liquid, that vertical integration did not pose a threat to competition 
(2003b).  It finally lifted all the self-supply restrictions in April 2004. 
 Ofgem’s response to recent merger proposals, however, is the clearest 
indication of its views on the state of the industry.  Without exception, every merger 
proposal since 2002 has been waved through without suggesting that it may be 
necessary to make a reference to the Competition Commission.  This includes even 
the October 2002 merger between PowerGen and TXU Europe, the former Eastern 
Group, which added 3 GW of capacity and two REC supply businesses to what was 
still one of the largest generators in the country.  To allow such a merger without 
                                                          
13 NGC could sell power to a supplier as if it were a generator itself, thus reducing the amount that the 
real generators would try to produce.  Some market participants were very wary of allowing NGC to 
trade energy, warning of the company’s privileged access to information, particularly about the 
transmission system and how this might affect the way it would be balancing the market.  While NGC 
had been prohibited from trading energy in 1990, presumably because of such fears, the regulator has 
been willing to allow this in the context of NETA. 
14 The old condition 9A had been renumbered as Licence Condition 18 when licences were reissued at 
the time of NETA. 
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suggesting further investigation is a clear sign that Ofgem believes that the industry is 
now sufficiently competitive.  
 
 
7. Assessment 
 
The structure created at privatisation is widely acknowledged to have been a mistake.  
In the early years, the major generators had a lot of market power, and the regulator 
had a difficult task in preventing its abuse.  His main weapons were publicity and the 
threat of a reference to the MMC.  A series of reports highlighted what he saw as 
acceptable practices (bidding to allow a constrained station to recover its estimated 
annual costs) and unacceptable ones, and put the generators under pressure to avoid 
the latter.  At the same time, he recognised that Pool prices in the first few years of the 
restructuring were artificially low, and that some increase was justified.  Wolfram 
(1999) finds that the generators could have supported a much higher Lerner index 
(price-cost margin relative to price) than they actually obtained, implying that their 
market power was restrained over this period. 
 When the increase in Pool prices went too far, the regulator used the threat of 
a reference to the MMC to persuade the generators to divest some of their plant, and 
to agree to the price undertaking.  This did protect some consumers to some extent, 
but was controversial when it was introduced, and would have been impossible to 
continue, except as a formal price control, completely inappropriate in a competitive 
market.  Long-term benefits thus depended on the divestitures.  Unfortunately, 
Eastern proved almost as happy to keep prices high as National Power and PowerGen 
had been, and the earn-out clause certainly raised its marginal costs.  At the same 
time, without the earn-out, the stations could well have been operated at base load, 
failing to create competition in the market segment where that was most wanted.  
Prices fell, but were still above estimates of new entrants’ costs.  Sweeting (2004) 
finds that the generators’ bids were roughly in line with their best response 
functions15 between 1997 and September 2000, whereas they had been supplying 
more than was privately profitable in 1995 and 1996.  In other words, the divestitures 
reduced their market power, but they started to use all, rather than just a part, of it.   
The generators’ second attempts at vertical integration gave the opportunity 
for further regulatory divestitures, which were followed by voluntary plant sales 
during 2000.  These sales fragmented the market and SMP finally fell significantly.  
The overall level of prices did not fall as much, for capacity payments were high in 
the Pool’s last two years.  This seems to have been due to the mix of plant, and 
occasionally high levels of outages, rather than to strategic behaviour on the part of 
generators.  At some times in the past, low levels of SMP had been in part a reaction 
to high capacity payments, in order to produce “reasonable” overall prices.  If this was 
still the case, then the Pool was arguably still prone to market power.  Given the 
increasingly fragmented market and the vertical integration by most of the large 
generators (reducing their incentive to raise wholesale prices), however, it is more 
likely that the reduction in SMP was a genuine competitive effect.  Evans and Green 
(2005) find that a supply function model of generators’ behaviour predicts monthly 
                                                          
15 These best response functions were the most profitable schedules of prices and quantities that a 
generator could have chosen for each day, given the industry demand and rival firms’ bids, and hence 
the residual demand facing that generator.  In another set of simulations, taking the generators’ likely 
contractual positions into account, Sweeting finds that they may even have been selling less than would 
have been privately profitable, behaviour consistent with tacit collusion to raise prices. 
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average prices (using SMP and then the closest equivalent, the UKPX Reference Price 
Data) reasonably well throughout this period, with no evidence of a structural break 
at, or near, the change in market rules. 
The way in which the Competition Commission approached the market abuse 
licence condition was partly responsible for the latter’s demise.  If the Commission 
had considered the implications of withdrawing the condition from every generator’s 
licence, rather than just those of AES and British Energy, would they have found 
more cause for concern?  There is a potential gap in the regulator’s powers to deal 
with abuses in electricity markets.  General competition legislation in both the UK 
and the EU deals with the abuse of a dominant position, generally defined as a market 
share of 40% or more.  In electricity markets, when the supply-demand balance gets 
tight, much smaller firms can abuse their position.  However, it can be nearly 
impossible to identify the particular firm that was “responsible” for an episode of high 
prices. 
The best way to achieve a competitive electricity market is to ensure that the 
rules can be changed if loopholes are manipulated, and that the structure is 
competitive, with a reasonable number of generators.  For most of its life, the Pool 
performed very poorly on the first count, although it became somewhat more 
responsive towards the end of its existence, and NETA is clearly an improvement on 
this front.  The market structure in England and Wales became far more competitive 
during the final years of the Pool, and prices fell.   
Can changing the rules mitigate market power in general?  Ofgem and the 
government have implied that the price reductions from 1998 onwards were, at least 
in part, “in anticipation … of NETA” (e.g. Ofgem, 2001, p 12), and that by changing 
the market rules, NETA had a significant impact on generators’ ability to exercise 
market power.  Bower (2002) and Newbery and McDaniel (2003) suggest that the 
reduction in energy prices was due to increased competition, not the change in the 
rules, although the abolition of capacity payments clearly contributed to the lower 
overall price level.  Evans and Green (2005) confirm this result by showing that the 
relationship between market fundamentals and prices did not change at any time close 
to the introduction of NETA. 
 One final point is that contracts (for a year or more) affect behaviour in spot 
markets.  Their very high levels of contract cover in the early 1990s meant that 
National Power and PowerGen could afford low prices in the Pool.  Short-lived price 
spikes cause little damage if most trades are covered by contracts.  Contracts are not a 
panacea, however, for they have to be renewed, and generators with market power 
will then want to ensure that spot prices are at a level that makes the contract prices 
they desire attractive to buyers.  The best way to mitigate market power is by starting 
with a competitive structure, and making sure that concentration does not rise over 
time. 
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Figure 1   (Output from Eastern and London is included in Independent Power Producers while those companies only had a little capacity) 
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